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Abstract—We extend the model of spatial social network for-
mation of Johnson and Gilles (Review of Economic Design,
2000, 5, 273-299) by situating each economic agent within one
of a set of discrete spatial locations and allowing agents to
maximise the utility that they gain from their direct and indirect
social contacts by relocating, in addition to forming or breaking
social links. This enables the exploration of scenarios in which
agents are able to alter the distance between themselves and
other agents at some cost. Agents in this model might represent
countries, ﬁrms or individuals, with the distance between a
pair of agents representing geographical, social or individual
differences. The network of social relationships characterises
some form of self-organised persistent interaction such as trade
agreements or friendship patterns. By varying the distance-
dependent costs of relocation and maintaining social relationships
we are able to identify conditions that promote the formation
of spatial organisations and network conﬁgurations that are
pairwise stable and efﬁcient. We also examine the associated
patterns in individual and aggregate agent behaviour. We ﬁnd
that both relative location and the order in which agents are
allowed to act can drastically affect individual utility. These traits
are found to be robust to random perturbations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the damage caused by the recent global
economic crisis, the UK government announced plans to
restructure the way in which the ﬁnancial markets are regulated
[2]. It is believed that suitable regulation could enable the
early detection and possible prevention of future crises by,
for example, encouraging market stability or reducing risk
[3]. Overall, this move has highlighted the importance of
understanding how complex economic systems, such as the
ﬁnancial markets, form and evolve over time.
Agent-based computational economics can be used to identify
conditions that promote positive economic behaviour and pro-
vide a testing platform for potential future policies [4].
1This work was supported by an EPSRC Doctoral Training Centre grant
(EP/G03690X/1).
Within the last ten years, research in economics has embraced
networks as an important explanatory tool for the highly com-
plex nature of economic systems [6]. For instance, networks
have been used to study social networking, trade routes and
the spread of information [5]. Networks are widely used across
disciplines as a way of representing and exploring interaction
patterns between entities, and are particularly useful for study-
ing the effect of low-level component changes at an aggregate
level. The structural representation of networks also enables
the detection of relationship patterns that might otherwise
be indiscernible, yet may still play an integral role to the
development of the system as a whole.
The formation and evolution of network structures is of key
interest to economists. In [1], Johnson and Gilles present a
model of endogenous network formation in which there is
a spatial cost topology (i.e. agents that are spaced further
from each other incur a larger cost of connection). This
extension to existing network formation models enables the
interaction between agents to be considered, in which the
distance between agents can represent geographical, social or
other differences.
However, agents were ﬁxed in position throughout the for-
mation process. When considering dynamic complex systems,
such as the economy, such static equilibrium models can have
limitations.
To address this, ﬁrst the spatially embedded network formation
model is made dynamic and simulated so that the formation
process itself can be examined in more detail. Second, the
dynamic model is further adapted to enable agents to be
spatially mobile. This mobility further extends the capability
of the model in expressing real-world systems, in which such
dynamics are often present. A cost of travel in the spatial
domain can also be applied to agents, acting as a limiting
factor.
This paper identiﬁes the conditions for stable and efﬁcient
network formation, and explores the dynamic behaviour of
agents over time.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a brief discussion on the relevant background literature;
Section 3 presents a model of spatial mobility in which travel
may be costly; Section 4 examines the behaviour of the model;Section 5 concludes.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
The foundations of this model lie in Jackson and Wolinsky’s
model of endogenous network formation [7] and Johnson and
Gilles’ spatially-embedded extension [1].
In the Connections Model [7], agents endogenously form
mutually-desirable links with other agents. An agent may
beneﬁt from both direct and indirect connections, but there
is an associated cost of maintaining a link. This is captured in
the agent’s utility function, which is used to determine whether
or not a link is worthwhile. Agents, therefore, have the ability
to add, maintain or remove links.
Using the Connections Model, Jackson and Wolinsky intro-
duce the concept of pairwise stable networks as those in which
no two unconnected agents would choose to form a link and
no single agent would choose to remove one. Additionally,
they consider the efﬁciency of networks. These two concepts
of stability and efﬁciency are fundamental to the exploration of
economic networks, and feature heavily in our analysis.
It was noted that though pairwise stable states were always
reachable, efﬁcient network conﬁgurations did not necessarily
form. For instance, under certain conditions star topologies,
though efﬁcient, were not pairwise stable.
A specialisation of this is the Symmetric Connections Model
in which all agents and links are identical. In this model, there
is a common, ﬁxed cost of linking and each agent has the same
‘intrinsic value’ to offer other agents. Therefore, agents only
differ in their connections and position in the network.
The abstractness and adaptability of the model enables it to be
applied in many areas. However, as an equilibrium model, the
dynamics of behaviour within the network or its evolution over
time can only really be considered through simulation.
In [8], a dynamic implementation of the Symmetric Connec-
tions Model was explored and robustness tested against errors
in agent decision-making. Dependent on the likelihood of an
error being made, the theoretical predictions of [7] were found
to be robust. It was also found that the time taken for a network
to form can increase exponentially after the introduction of
error.
The dynamic implementation highlighted the importance of
simulating static models: a more ﬁne-grained cross-section of
the original model’s behaviour was able to be identiﬁed, and
the effect of what were previously considered design choices
could be studied in more detail.
In [1], Johnson and Gilles’ extend the Connections Model by
introducing a spatial cost topology designed to incorporate the
concept that during the formation of most real-world networks
the distance between agents can also affect how worthwhile a







Fig. 1: Examples of Occupancy and Neighbourhoods
physical space, but can be used, for example, to represent the
differences between agents.
Johnson and Gilles’ Spatial Connections Model situates agents
on the real line, which is used to represent the social distance
between them. Agents again choose which connections to add,
maintain and remove dependent on a utility function, which
now includes the imposed linear cost topology. They ﬁnd that
when the cost of a connection is high, there is a unique stable
network, which is not the case when costs are low.
Spatial mobility in models with both spatial and social capital
is a familiar concept in demographic models [9]. Of particular
interest to simulation modellers is the order in which the
processes take place. For instance, should agents be allowed to
move before they connect? Should they be allowed to move as
often? This combination of connection, spatial embeddedness
and spatial mobility remains an interesting modelling chal-
lenge, and is a key theme of this paper.
III. THE MODEL
A ﬁnite set of agents N = f1;2;:::;ng are situated at discrete
locations L = f1;2;:::;lg. No more than one agent can occupy
a single location at a given time2, and not every location is
occupied.
Let occupancy refer to the proportion of unique locations
containing an agent, and a neighbourhood refer to a set of
agents such that for any two agents there is a path between
those agents that has full occupancy (see Figure 1).
Unlike [1] in which agents are situated along the real line,
a ﬁnite number of locations exist in the agent world. This is
because on the real line, unless agents may occupy the same
location, it is always possible to lessen the distance between
two agents. This poses implementation problems when spatial
mobility is introduced, since agents that wish to minimise
the distance between themselves would end up stretching the
computational limits of numerical accuracy. Therefore, we
ﬁnitely discretise the space and introduce occupiable gaps
2This is a design choice and has little effect on the overall dynamics of the
system.
2between agents. Additionally, the measure used by Johnson
and Gilles to determine the distance between two agents is the
cardinality of the set of agents between them. Here, distance
refers to the number of locations between two agents.
It must be noted that the spatial boundary conditions that exist
in [1] result in an implicit asymmetry amongst agents. This
asymmetry becomes more pronounced as the ﬁxed cost of
connection increases, causing the position of an agent to have a
greater effect on its utility. Therefore, in order to better explore
the effect of introducing spatial mobility, spatial boundaries are
removed (i.e. locations 1 and l are neighbours, as are 1 and 2).
Though this is perhaps less realistic when locations are used to
represent geographical placements, it enables agent dynamics
to be considered more clearly.
A network g 2 G represents the relationships between agents:
g  (N  N). The binary relationship between two agents i
and j is given by ij 2 f0;1g, where 1 indicates a connection
and 0 indicates no connection. Note that ii = 0 8i. Since
relationships are symmetric: ij = ji and g can be shown by
an undirected graph.
It is often useful to refer to the topology of the network during
formation.
A network g is fully connected or complete when
forall i j, ij 2 g.
A network g is a line when forall ij 2 g there is
always a path between i and j, exactly two agents
have one connection, while remaining agents have
exactly two connections.
A network g is a ring when forall ij 2 g there is
always a path between i and j and all agents have
exactly two connections.
A situation s 2 S refers to which agents are at which
locations: s  (N  L).
The agent world w 2 W is a collection of agents, their
locations and their connections: w 2 (S  G).
At initialisation in each simulation, each agent is assigned a
unique random location and has no connections.
An agent may perform two types of action: spatial (1)
and social (2). Therefore, we deﬁne two action sets as fol-
lows:
Ai
sp = fmaintains;movelg (1)
Ai
soc = fmaintaing;addij;removeijg (2)
where maintains is to maintain its current situation s;
movel is to move to location l;
maintaing is to maintain its current connections g;
addij is to add the connection ij;
removeij is to remove the connection ij.
When selected to act, an agent i performs a spatial action
ai
sp 2 Ai
sp and a series of social actions ai
soc 2 P(Ai
soc). That
is, they choose a location (spatial) and connection set (social)
to maximise their utility, and then perform the actions to
change the state of the world3. The agent’s current or potential
social connections incentivises its spatial decision of whether
or not to move. This presents the model with two timescales:
one for spatial and one for social actions.
The presence of two such timescales is often found in demo-
graphic literature [9]. It is often seen to be the case that spatial
actions occur less often than social actions. In other words, a
change in location is a longer process than the formation of
connections. This is the approach adopted here. Hence, in our
model, once selected an agent may perform one spatial action
followed by a series of social actions.
Despite this difference in timescales, unselected agents cannot
perform even the shorter-timescale social actions until both the
spatial and social actions of the selected agent are executed.
This is done to simplify the model.
An individual agent’s turn terminates when it chooses to
maintain its current network, rather than add or remove any
connections: maintaing. This assumption of inertia (that
is, that satisﬁed agents stay put) is common in simulation
literature [10]. Note that it is still possible for an agent to prefer
to add a connection rather than maintain its current network,
but it cannot choose this action unless the agent it wishes to
connect to consents. However, an agent does not need consent
to remove one of its existing connections.
Until stability is reached, an agent is selected at random to
act. Note, the existing deﬁnition of stability is here extended
to include spatial actions:
A world w is stable if each agent would choose to
both maintain its current location (maintainl) and
its current connections (maintaing).
During simulation, only agents that have not yet reached
stability may be randomly selected to act. These agents are
termed textitunstable. This does not effect the outcome of the
simulation, only its duration since.
The concept of efﬁciency is similarly extended:
A world w is in an efﬁcient state if both the spatial
and social conﬁgurations maximise the total utility
of all agents over the set of all possible worlds.
In reality, there may be some cost of travel ct experienced
by an agent when moving between spatial locations in the
same way that there is a cost of connection when forming a
connection with another agent. Similarly, this cost of travel
should be proportional to the distance between locations. For
example, it should be more costly to travel longer distances.
This is true of many real-world scenarios involving travelling
between locations; consider the difference in the cost of petrol
3Note that even though they ‘plan’ a series of actions, agents still do not
use foresight: each subsequent action selected is chosen because it is a utility
maximising action given that the previous actions have taken place.
3when driving somewhere relatively local and somewhere far
away.
In evaluating its action choices, an agent considers its utility
function, which considers two states of the agent world: the
current state (g0;s0) and the state that the agent’s proposed
action set (ai
sp and ai
soc) would bring about (g;s).
The utility to player i of social connections network g and
spatial conﬁguration s given the current network and conﬁg-







dij   ct  di(s;s0) (3)
where  is the intrinsic value of an agent;
tij is the number of links in the shortest path between
i and j;
c is the base cost of maintaining a direct link;
dij is the geodesic distance between i and j;
ct is the cost of travel;
di(s;s0) is the distance between agent i’s position in
s and s0.
Note: 0    1 and 0  c  1. This maintains the idea that
the more indirect the graphical connection between agents, the
less the beneﬁt an agent receives from it.
When selected, an agent uses its utility function to evaluate
the payoff it would receive by either moving to any free
location on the grid or maintaining its current location, and
adding, removing or maintaining any links. The agent here
operates with complete information when evaluating potential
connections and positionings. Since agents are self-interested
and utility-maximising, the actions it chooses to execute are
those that provide the greatest immediate payoff.
Simulations were run in Java using Eclipse IDE and the JUNG
library.
IV. RESULTS
An agent always seeks to minimise its cost and maximise
its proﬁt during decision making. Since cost is dependent
on distance, an agent always chooses the shortest path when
evaluating a connection to another agent.
We introduce the following notation:
Let H be the number of neighbourhoods;
O be the occupancy;
dmin be the smallest distance between two agents;
dmax be the largest distance between two agents.
Note: initially, the cost of travel is removed (ct = 0). This
is true for all cases unless otherwise stated. This greatly
simpliﬁes the model and enables a more detailed investigation
into its behaviour.
Fig. 2: Graph Showing Individual and Average Utility over
time for c <  
2
dmax (n = 20, O = 100%,  = 0:5, c = 0)
A. Consider O = 100%
Under full occupancy, no agent has the opportunity to move.
This is similar to a simulated Spatial Connections Model with
no spatial boundaries and agents that can perform multiple
social actions during a single turn.
Here, dmin = 1 and dmax = b
jLj
2 c. This presents ﬁve cases
for investigation. However, dependent on the input parameters,
some of these may not always be applicable4.
When c <  
2
dmax :
The payoff from a direct connection is always positive and
preferable to the payoff from an indirect connection. Once
selected to act, an agent will therefore choose to connect to
all other agents.
There is only one stable network: the fully connected network.
Since only agents that do not want to maintain their current
network are chosen to act, stability is always reached, and
takes n   1 timesteps.
This unique stable network is also the unique efﬁcient conﬁg-
uration.
Figure 2 shows the utility of each of the agents at each time
step during a simulation. The average utility at each timestep is
also shown. As can be seen, once selected, an agent’s actions
cause it to reach its maximum utility, simultaneously increas-
ing the utilities of unstable agents and raising the population
average. Due to the symmetry in the network and model, all
agents receive the same payoff at equilibrium.
This result is fully robust to random perturbations such as
the removal of links or agents, since any unstable agents
will always act to restore the unique stable state, as well as




dmax < c < 
dmax:
4For example, the third case does not exist when  = 0:5 and N = 5.
4Fig. 3: Histogram showing the number of connections and ﬁnal
utilities of each agent. Note: the order of selection began with
agents 25, 16 and 8.
The payoff from a direct connection is always positive but
may not always be preferable to an indirect connection. An
agent is able to afford (that is, receive a positive payoff from)
directly connecting to all other agents in the world, but would
prefer some indirect connections.
The ﬁrst agent selected will always connect to all other agents.
This is because there are no existing indirect connections it
could utilise in order to minimise cost. However, this is not
the case for subsequently chosen agents who, dependent on
their proximity to other agents, may not need to connect to all
of the agents they are not currently connected to. The result of
this is that, once stability has been reached, not all agents have
the same utility or the same number of connections (see Figure
3), and the ﬁrst agent is always signiﬁcantly worse off.
There is no longer a unique efﬁcient conﬁguration, since both
the order of agent selection and the relative spatial positionings
of the agents can be seen to affect the network formation.
However, it is interesting to note that, due to the symmetry
in the model, the overall value of the stable network that is
formed is consistent throughout simulations.
Dependent on the order of selection, the time to stability can
vary.
As would be expected, the utility of each agent over time be-
haves in a similar way to the previous case with the exception
of the ﬁrst selected agent. This agent is signiﬁcantly penalised
for the duration of the simulation (see Figure 4). The larger
the number of agents, the larger this divide becomes.
Though the actions of the remaining agents do still increase
the utility of each other, not all of them reach the highest
obtainable utility values: a permanent imbalance in utilities
has be introduced.
When 
dmax < c <  
2
dmin :
No agent can afford to directly connect to all other agents
but some direct connections may still be preferable to indirect
connections.
Just as before, the ﬁrst agent chosen connects to all agents
within an affordable range. Subsequent agents attempt to
utilise existing groups of already connected agents to min-
Fig. 4: Graph Showing Individual and Average Utility over
time for  
2
dmax < c < 
dmax (n = 50, O = 100%,  = 0:5,
c = 0:035)
Fig. 5: Histogram showing the number of connections and ﬁnal
utilities of each agent. Note: the order of selection began with
agents 25, 10 and 24.
imise their costs. This causes a wider spread in agent utility
than before. However, as the cost of a direct connection is
proportionally increasing, this becomes more pronounced (see
Figures 5 and 6).
It is interesting to note that, beyond the ﬁrst few agents
chosen to act (i.e. those that cannot utilise existing indirect
connections), the order of selection does not appear to play
a signiﬁcant role in affecting the agents’ ﬁnal utilities. It is
no longer the case that the ﬁrst agent to act receives a lower
payoff than all other agents in the ﬁnal state.
As costs increase, the number of connections that an agent
can maintain is reduced. Stable networks therefore begin
to contain fewer links. Distant links are less desirable, so
the network begins to look more ring-like in its topology.
Evenly distributed ring-like structures (i.e. those in which all
agents have approximately the same number of connections)
are more efﬁcient than other topologies, but the order of




dmin < c < 
dmin:
The payoff from a direct connection may be positive but not
always preferable to an indirect connection. An agent always
prefers indirect connections to direct connections.
This results in a ring-like network forming. This is the unique
5Fig. 6: Graph Showing Individual and Average Utility over
time for 
dmax < c <  
2
dmin (n = 20, O = 100%,  = 0:5,
c = 0:15)
Fig. 7: Histogram showing the number of connections and ﬁnal
utilities of each agent. Note: the order of selection began with
agents 10, 12 and 20.
efﬁcient network conﬁguration and also stable. However, there
are additional stable conﬁgurations in which the network
branches. This is because, dependent on the order of selection,
it may be more proﬁtable for an agent to make more than the
two connections to its nearest neighbours.
The order of selection and relative position of agents to
agents that have already acted, becomes more signiﬁcant in
determining an agent’s utility over time. There is much more
variance in an agent’s utility transitions over time.
When 
dmin < c:
Here, no agent can afford the cost of a direct connection (even
to their neighbour). Therefore, the only stable state is one in
which all agents are disconnected from each other. This is also
an efﬁcient conﬁguration since all other conﬁgurations result
in negative payoffs.
B. Consider 0 < O < 100% and H = 1
As an agent always seeks to minimise its cost during decision
making, and since cost is dependent on distance, an agent
always chooses the shortest path when evaluating a connection
to another agent: the geodesic distance. The behaviour of the
systems can now be divided into two cases.
Let dgap be the length of the path between two peripheral
agents that passes through no other agent.
Fig. 8: Graph Showing Individual and Average Utility over
time for  
2
dmin < c < 




The largest geodesic distance between two agents is dmax. This
results in similar behaviour to the previous model, despite the
potential for agents to move location.
When 
c < dgap:
The largest geodesic distance between two agents is n 1 (i.e.
dependent on the number of agents). This is equivalent to a
bounded, linear model similar to [1].
Network Topologies
As c increases, stable networks form with fewer links. How-
ever, agents utilise existing paths within the neighbourhood by
forming line-like connections along it. For smaller c, agents
also create small loops along the line to reduce the number
of indirect links they have. As would be expected, when
c <  
2
dmax , all links are made, and when c > 
dmin, no links are
made. Therefore, topologies favour line formations.
Agent Mobility
Since agents are already in a neighbourhood, and therefore
have at least one neighbour with whom direct connection is
available at the minimum cost, agent movement is unlikely,
but possible. For higher occupancy values, agent movement is
more likely.
Agents that move do so in order to create the best trade-off
between their connections and location. This can result in them
forming their own neighbourhood, which might attract other
agents.
Once local connections have been made, an agent can become
locked into its position: in order to maintain a larger number
of cheaper, closer connections, they do not move. This effect
can be detrimental to agents at the edges of neighbourhoods,
since for any positive cost of connection, they are much
more limited in the payoff they receive. This results in a
arch shapes in utilities across the neighbourhood with perifery
agents performing signiﬁcantly worse than central agents. This
effect becomes much more pronounced for larger n and c and
6Fig. 9: Graph Showing Average Agent Utility for High and
Low Occupancy Values Across 30 Runs (n = 20, H = 1,
 = 0:5, c = 0:3)
also makes it more likely that agents perform the majority of
their spatial actions earlier in the simulation.
Efﬁciency
For positive c, as occupancy decreases, the efﬁciency of the
ﬁnal network decreases as well: this shows a strong positive
correlation (see Figure 10). However, the spread of utility
across agents increases. This pattern is not surprising:
Since there is only one neighbourhood, and due to the spatial
cost topology, agents are likely to ﬁrst prefer connecting
to local agents. For larger occupancy values, due to the
removal of spatial boundaries, agents at the peripheries of
neighbourhoods may still be able to form connections with
each other, even if they are unable to connect to more central
agents. However, as occupancy decreases, the gap between
these peripheral agents increases and so connections become
less likely. Therefore, the efﬁciency of these agents reduces,
as does the overal network efﬁciency. However, central agents
are less affected. This pattern can be seen in Figure 9, which
shows the distribution of utilities across agents for high a low
occupancy values.
As soon as 
c becomes less than dgap, peripheral agents
become unable to afford to connect to agents on the other
side of the gap. This results in the network behaving like a
bounded model, rather than an unbounded one. This can be
seen in the variance of agents in Figure 10. In the graph, when
occupancy is becomes less than 87%5, there is a sharp increase
in the variance of agent utilities, as would be expected. This
eventually levels out.
C. Consider 0 < O < 100% and H > 1:
As soon as multiple neighbourhoods are permitted, the com-
plexity of the system increases. The time for a stable network
to form can vary greatly, as can agent efﬁciency, the frequency
of spatial actions etc. Dependent on the occupancy, the initial
5This is the value at which 
c < dgap.
Fig. 10: Graph Showing Average and Variance in Agent Utility
across Occupancy Values Across 30 Runs (n = 20, H = 1,
 = 0:5, c = 0:3)
distribution of agents and the cost of connection, different
types of network can form: the order of agent selection
plays an increasingly signiﬁcant role in the network forma-
tion.
However, the patterns identiﬁed in the simpler cases above
are still applicable. For instance, for valid c and , agents
will always seek the most connections they can afford, whilst
minimising the cost. Therefore, agents will move to areas
that are more densely populated: larger neighbourhoods can
act as attractors, as do small gaps between groups of agents.
An example of this can be seen in Figure 11, in which the
agent world starts with six neighbourhoods and ends with
two. Despite no cost of travel yet imposed, agents do not
form a single neighbourhood. This is because of the lock-
in effect of connections described earlier. The behavioural
boundaries are still deﬁned by dgap, which is now a peripheral
agent’s distance to another peripheral agent from the nearest
neighbourhood.
It is interesting to note that, though spatial mobility improves
the overall efﬁciency of an agent world, there is no evidence
to suggest that agents that move perform better (i.e. receive
a higher payoff) than those that maintain their location. It
is thought that this is due to the bidirectionality of connec-
tions.
D. Consider ct > 0:
The introduction of a cost of travel acts as a limiting factor in
agent mobility.
Trivially, if the cost of travel is too large, regardless of the
beneﬁt of potential connection, an agent will never change
their position. This happens when, despite more beneﬁcial
locations existing, the cost of moving to them is less than
the beneﬁt. The precise threshold value of this is dependent
on the speciﬁc setup (i.e. occupancy, distribution of agents, c,
, ...).
Similarly, when the cost of travel is always less than the beneﬁt
7Fig. 11: Screenshots of the First (left) and Final (right)
timesteps of a simulation (n = 12, H = 6, O = 40%,  = 0:5,
c = 0:2). In each window, the left panel represents the agent
grid world, and the central panel represents the connections
between agents.
Fig. 12: Two sample simulation runs for N = 15, O = 30%,
 = 0:5, c = 0:1, ct = 1
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to be gained by moving, agents are not limited in how far they
can travel. The simplest cases of this is when ct = 0.
For intermediate cases, dependent on the system setup some
agents may be able to move to shrink the gap between
them and other agents, but not necessarily remove it entirely.
Similarly, it is no longer the case that agents form a single
connected unit in a single neighbourhood; both c and ct
limit the networks that form (see Figure 12). Since the order
of agent selection has an even greater effect that before on
the network formation, the likelihood of efﬁcient networks
forming are again reduced.
E. Robustness
The results derived from all models in this paper were tested
for robustness by varying initial parameter settings, such as
N. Additionally, noise was injected to the system by removing
existing links, adding new links, and repositioning agents at
random.
It was found that the trends identiﬁed were robust to these
perturbations, further supporting the ﬁndings.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model of endogenous network formation
that incorporates the concept of agents that are spatially
mobile. We have also identiﬁed the states that promote efﬁcient
network formation and those that encourage rich-poor divides
across agent populations.
In particular, it was found that though agent mobility improved
the overall efﬁciency of an agent world, there was no evidence
to suggest that those who moved performed better than those
who maintained their location. Additionally, it was found that
the order in which agents were selected to act, along with
their spatial position, had the most signiﬁcant effect on their
individual performance.
However, there are several limitations to our model, such
as the division of timescales in agent decision-making and
the linearity of the spatial world. These were largely design
choices and provide possible starting points for extension.
Other extensions include agent heterogeneity, games on net-
works, games of imperfect information, signalling and indirect
communication. Additionally, it would be interesting to con-
sider the effect that agents with bounded foresight would have
on the model.
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